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From Freedom Fighters to Jihadists

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From Freedom Fighters to Jihadists

Metadata

  • Author: Vera Mironova
  • Full Title: From Freedom Fighters to Jihadists
  • Category: #books

Highlights

  • They lived like those in any other similar institution, except for an Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) twist to some details, like a sign on the door of a camp I once visited. The sign could be roughly translated as, “Dear Brother Jihadists, for everything holy on this planet, please wash the dishes. God bless you.” (Location 65)
  • He belonged to a radical sect of chain takfiris, which is one of the most radical branches of Salafi Wahhabism to date; adherents believe that a person who does not accuse an apostate of heresy is an apostate himself. He had left ISIS only because ISIS was not radical enough. According to him, ISIS was not properly enforcing sharia law and had been too lenient with Syrian locals (whom he did not consider to be Muslims). For that matter, he did not even consider his own family members to be Muslims. (Location 157)
  • Compared to other former fighters and ISIS supporters, he also followed all the rules he believed in meticulously. For example, since he considered any interaction with the civilian (non-sharia) institutions prohibited, before installing any computer application he would carefully read its thirty pages of terms and conditions through Google translate to make sure that he did not click to accept it if there was any mention of solving potential disputes in court. For half a (Location 160)
  • One time his father asked me, “Since Ali listens to you, can you please tell him to stop calling his mother kafir [infidel], because it really offends her, a devoted Muslim woman?” (Location 171)
  • If Ali’s own family, whom he totally depends on for survival while he is in hiding, could do nothing about his religious dedication, how did ISIS as an organization manage people like him? To me, it seemed like a human resources problem that was almost impossible to solve. (Location 174)
  • In academia, I first of all want to thank Lt. Col. Craig Whiteside US Army (Ret.) for giving me the best advice in my academic career: “To get combat experience, you need to be on the battlefield. . . . Just do not join U.S. military. By the time they send you somewhere, you will miss everything.” (Location 214)
  • This multifactional front is a growing military trend in conflicts. Two-thirds of all civil wars between 1989 and 2003 involved more than one rebel group fighting against the government,1 and since that time, the number of armed groups per civil war is constantly increasing. (Location 228)
  • groups fighting for the same goal within a rebel bloc are also competing for the same potential members, and it is a group’s policies that determine its recruiting, and ultimately its overall, success. (Location 259)
  • I show that after the initial decision to take up arms (which is based on individual grievances), fighters view armed groups (fighting for the goal they are interested in) as institutions and make the decision to join or switch groups by comparing their organizational capabilities. The groups that are the best organized internally, have less corruption, and provide more for their members become the most popular with fighters. (Location 264)
  • However, one side effect of using ideology as a screening mechanism is attracting people more interested in ideology than in the actual goal of the group: power. (Location 270)
  • Most previous evidence in insurgency violence literature is post hoc, relying on retrospective interviews of survivors or an individual fighter’s online footprint. My data, drawn from in-person surveys and interviews on the frontlines of the ongoing conflict, affords information gathered in near real-time, avoids survivorship bias, and also sheds light on the intentions of fighters in making particular decisions. (Location 278)
  • while a significant body of academic and policy research is looking at the “violence” part of the definition, trying to understand why and how groups engage in violence, the human, “group” part of it often receives less attention—even though without the humans, there is no group (and, as a result, no one to conduct those acts of violence). (Location 350)
  • Recent research, however, has started paying more attention to the internal structure of rebel movements through comparative analyses, a very important step toward understanding violent non-state actors’ internal organization and human resources. In his book, Jacob Shapiro shows that one of the main difficulties armed groups struggle with is their human resources. (Location 395)
  • Jeremy Weinstein, in comparing leading insurgency groups in different countries, looks at why some rebellions are ideologically motivated, while others are more oriented toward immediate profit, and how it affects recruitment.10 According to his argument, a group either enjoys resources and is consumption-oriented or is ideologically motivated with limited resources, and a group’s recruitment strategy depends on this classification. (Location 398)
  • On one hand, research looks at the first step prospective fighters take, answering the question, “What makes individuals take up weapons?” For example, organizers of rebellions use three principal ways to recruit soldiers: forced recruitment,12 offering immediate material incentives or promising such benefits in the future,13 or appealing to the fighters’ sense of grievance.14 It has also been shown that relative deprivation,15 in-group ties and bonds,16 out-group aversions,17 the desire to improve one’s social status,18 the relative danger of remaining a civilian,19 social networks,20 and even simple boredom21 drive people to mobilize for violence. (Location 410)
    • Note: Citations
  • As previously shown by the works of Iannaccone and Berman, radical ideology and a strict set of concordant internal rules allow a group not only to screen prospective members, but also to ensure that only the most dedicated fighters remain in the group.29 (Location 458)
  • While being effectively organized allows groups to win the competition for human resources—their most important resource—the right use of ideology ensures the quality of those human resources. As a result, well-organized groups are more likely to look like the most ideological. (Location 482)
  • As part of the broader “Voices of Syria” project (with Sam Whitt and Loubna Mrie), more than six hundred refugees, civilians, and fighters were surveyed on how they self-selected into those roles. (Location 513)
  • In addition, retrospective studies also negatively impact individual-level research. When these studies are conducted in the aftermath of an especially protracted, brutal civil war, there is an obvious selection bias for survivors, and it is not clear how people who survived differ from those who did not. For example, fighters who chose to fight in the most active combat zones are killed in disproportionate numbers and are therefore minimally present in such studies. Conducting surveys for four years of conflict on frontlines of varying intensity allowed me to reach as many respondents as possible, people who would no longer be alive after the conflict was over. It is very likely that many, if not most, of the fighters and civilians surveyed and interviewed for the study are no longer alive. (Location 516)
  • 10 Jeremy M. Weinstein, Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 11 Eli Berman, Radical, Religious, and Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011). (Location 641)
  • 21 Enzo Nussio and Juan E. Ugarriza, “Are Insurgents Any Different from Counterinsurgents? A Systematic Integration and Validation of Motivational Studies from Colombia.” A Systematic Integration and Validation of Motivational Studies from Colombia (August 16, 2013). Forthcoming in Análisis Político (2013). (Location 661)
  • Therefore, a group would win this market competition by making itself the most appealing to potential new adherents and those who would switch from other rebel groups. This would both increase the one group’s resources and decrease that of competitors in this zero–sum game. (Location 729)
  • In low-technology civil wars, where all groups only have access to older weapons, power is a function of human resources, and the group that wins the internal competition for manpower will have a significant advantage. (Location 735)
    • Note: This is key
  • Those people who prefer to stay do not perform a cost–benefit calculation in quite the same way. Although they understand the risks involved, some do not leave only because they want to protect their family and property. Others are interested in the goals of the rebellion and want to support it. Consequently, those who stay to support the goal of the war enter the pool of potential members rebel groups are competing for. (Location 760)
  • It is telling if a person was active in the civil war before any material resources became available, and when it was particularly dangerous to participate in the rebellion. Another way armed groups can see if a fighter is devoted to the goal is to send him, from time to time, to the most active frontline to fight. Here the group can monitor his behavior. (Location 848)
  • economic club model theory of religious groups and sects developed by Iannaccone (1994), (Location 859)
  • To ensure they get only the most trustworthy and loyal prospective fighters, the most organized, successful, and well-funded groups not only screen prospective fighters, but also add a cost to membership. They do so by presenting prospective fighters with a condition: adherence to a strict set of requirements that have no direct relevance to their fighting ability. (Location 861)
  • First, they should be costly for the individual, which means he must make significant effort to follow them. If those costs are not high enough, they are not a good screening mechanism because they would be too easy for someone to fake. Also, the requirements should not be enjoyable. People who enjoy the requirements cannot be separated from fighters who behave strategically, and as a result, the group’s ability to screen decreases. (Location 865)
  • such costs should also be very visible because their main purpose is to indicate when someone is slacking. (Location 871)
  • While organizational culture in the civilian world might sometimes seem a little strange, the unproductive costs and strict requirements employed by armed groups look irrational and bizarre at best. Consequently, groups need to at least try to explain the rationale behind them to their members. Ideology—which by definition is a group-specified set of ideals, principles, beliefs, doctrines, myths, or symbols of a social movement, institution, class, or large group that explains how society should work—often comes in handy for that purpose. To be able to serve as a rationale for assuming unproductive costs of membership in a group, an ideology should satisfy several conditions. (Location 876)
  • Ideology as a screening mechanism has proven to be reliable, but it is not without problems, some of which are quite unexpected. (Location 892)
  • Adopting strict rules grounded in ideology can screen out people with low dedication levels from a group, but it cannot control the upper bar of dedication. (Location 937)
  • Therefore, a group that portrays itself as ideological may be attractive to recruits more interested in the ideology than in the actual goal of the group. In other words, these recruits may be more radical than the group wants its fighters to be. (Location 938)
  • Because those group members are more interested in the ideology than in the group’s military and political objections, they put ideological objectives in front of military necessity and, as a result, make the group less effective on the battlefield and in the political arena. 2.Once in the group, they soon realize it was not what they expected and become disappointed. From there, it is only a matter of time until they act on that disappointment. They might stay in the group and sabotage it from the inside, or leave and harm its reputation from the outside. 3.More radical group members will not be satisfied with the average level of the group’s ideology and will try to increase it to their desirable level, challenging the leadership. And because by definition they are extremely dedicated to their goal, little would stop them in pursuing those changes. (Location 947)
  • Many group characteristics that are attractive to prospective members, such as salaries and medical care, are not only expensive but are also long-lasting in nature, requiring long-term investments. In effect, one of the main jobs of leaders is to balance the budget, maximize income, and optimize spending. In contrast to regular state armies, rebel armed groups do not have a budget assigned to them every year. (Location 973)
  • This shows that no organization can have a successful long-term strategy if it does not have leaders with the right qualifications to plan it; and no good plan will work if there is no one capable of executing it. (Location 989)
  • Successful groups are able to find or internally promote the most qualified people, learn from their own mistakes and the mistakes of others, and build a functioning organization, while unsuccessful ones fail to do so. Unsuccessful groups think meritocracy is not the most effective system for choosing leadership. Other unsuccessful groups, while realizing the importance of choosing the most qualified candidates, cannot always find or recognize people with the right qualifications. (Location 993)
  • An additional problem faced by rebel groups is the high likelihood of leaders—in top and middle levels—being killed in combat. In an ordinary organization, a director’s tenure is already established, and even if he becomes sick or wants to retire, he will usually have time to choose and train a successor. This is not the case in a combat zone. Here, a group leader could be killed in a matter of seconds without having chosen a substitute or passed on any knowledge. Even more devastating to a group is the death of several leaders at the same time. (Location 1026)
  • A fighter who wants to get promoted will try to show his loyalty by exceeding minimal behavioral requirements imposed by the group’s Islamist ideology. (Location 1046)
  • 8 I. S. Fulmer, B. Gerhart, and K. S. Scott, “Are the 100 Best Better? An Empirical Investigation of the Relationship Between Being a ‘Great Place to Work’ and Firm Performance,” Personnel Psychology 56 (2003): 965–993. (Location 1104)
  • 26 Larry E. Greiner, “Evolution and Revolution as Organizations Grow,” Harvard Business Review 54, no. 4 (July/August 1972): 37–46. (Location 1140)
  • When the revolution turned into a civil war, everything changed. There were no more playing children, open shops, or cars on the street. Instead, people with weapons (fighters) were sitting at checkpoints drinking tea brought to them by people without weapons (civilians), and watching others flee their homes (refugees). (Location 1148)
  • A sample of fighters and civilians was chosen from two areas: in and around Aleppo, Syria’s second largest city and the place of the major battles at the time of research, and in and around the city of Idlib, which was also experiencing violence but generally was considered a safer area for rebel forces and civilians. Because I am interested in difficult-to-reach subpopulations in dangerous environments with unknown population parameters, I use cluster-sampling methods. (Location 1159)
  • Another, deeper cause surfaced and rose far above the others: the desire for revenge. (Location 1313)
  • In racking up only a few votes, civilians strongly disagreed that fighters joined for money (2 percent) or respect (4 percent), or were forced to join (0 percent). (Location 1351)
  • Among Assad’s perceived crimes against the Syrian people were attacking peaceful demonstrators, arresting children in Daraa for writing anti-Assad graffiti,10 massacring hundreds in Homs in 2012, and even spending the majority of Syrian oil revenue on the regime army. Most of the time, not even regime troops were considered the object of revenge. Even concerning the chemical attacks, surveyed fighters put blame solely on Assad, while only slightly more than half of respondents blamed his forces. In addition, 15 percent of surveyed fighters believed Assad’s troops were not guilty at all in this incident. (Location 1357)
  • Overall, when compared to civilians, fighters were happier, most likely because they were acting on their grievances in a way in which they could see results. (Location 1363)
  • Revenge may have its emotional perks, but there is also an emotional downside. Fighters were extremely angry and extremely sad twice as often as civilians, and felt more exhausted (Graph 2.5). They were also twice as likely as their civilian counterparts to experience extreme fear. (Location 1369)
  • Another fighter, formerly with the Islamist group Fajr al Islam (now part of al-Nusra) before leaving in 2014, recalls, After the end of Alsehel battle with Shia militias, and the regime took control of the villages around our positions, I thought, “Why am I still fighting?” I had lost my right hand to a sniper shot, and when I was bleeding, no one could help because we simply did not have enough people. . . . we only had Kalashnikovs [AK47s], while the enemy had tanks and planes. I felt that God’s angels were helping us, but rationally I thought, “What can a left-handed man do in front of those tanks? Nothing”. . . so I found a way to get out of the city and ended up opening a small restaurant to sell falafel. Now the only thing I am fighting for is food for my kids. (Location 1413)
  • Many former fighters had also become frustrated with the lack of organization in their groups. Bad leadership was an important factor for 65 percent of respondents while 59 percent pointed to the lack of discipline. More than 52 percent said their group was not working as a team anymore. Generally, if fighters were dissatisfied with the organization of their group, they simply switched groups, (Location 1420)
  • A strong majority (76 percent) claimed that they would fight again if the West were to intervene militarily. (Location 1435)

public: true

title: From Freedom Fighters to Jihadists longtitle: From Freedom Fighters to Jihadists author: Vera Mironova url: , source: kindle last_highlight: 2020-08-13 type: books tags:

From Freedom Fighters to Jihadists

rw-book-cover

Metadata

  • Author: Vera Mironova
  • Full Title: From Freedom Fighters to Jihadists
  • Category: #books

Highlights

  • They lived like those in any other similar institution, except for an Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) twist to some details, like a sign on the door of a camp I once visited. The sign could be roughly translated as, “Dear Brother Jihadists, for everything holy on this planet, please wash the dishes. God bless you.” (Location 65)
  • He belonged to a radical sect of chain takfiris, which is one of the most radical branches of Salafi Wahhabism to date; adherents believe that a person who does not accuse an apostate of heresy is an apostate himself. He had left ISIS only because ISIS was not radical enough. According to him, ISIS was not properly enforcing sharia law and had been too lenient with Syrian locals (whom he did not consider to be Muslims). For that matter, he did not even consider his own family members to be Muslims. (Location 157)
  • Compared to other former fighters and ISIS supporters, he also followed all the rules he believed in meticulously. For example, since he considered any interaction with the civilian (non-sharia) institutions prohibited, before installing any computer application he would carefully read its thirty pages of terms and conditions through Google translate to make sure that he did not click to accept it if there was any mention of solving potential disputes in court. For half a (Location 160)
  • One time his father asked me, “Since Ali listens to you, can you please tell him to stop calling his mother kafir [infidel], because it really offends her, a devoted Muslim woman?” (Location 171)
  • If Ali’s own family, whom he totally depends on for survival while he is in hiding, could do nothing about his religious dedication, how did ISIS as an organization manage people like him? To me, it seemed like a human resources problem that was almost impossible to solve. (Location 174)
  • In academia, I first of all want to thank Lt. Col. Craig Whiteside US Army (Ret.) for giving me the best advice in my academic career: “To get combat experience, you need to be on the battlefield. . . . Just do not join U.S. military. By the time they send you somewhere, you will miss everything.” (Location 214)
  • This multifactional front is a growing military trend in conflicts. Two-thirds of all civil wars between 1989 and 2003 involved more than one rebel group fighting against the government,1 and since that time, the number of armed groups per civil war is constantly increasing. (Location 228)
  • groups fighting for the same goal within a rebel bloc are also competing for the same potential members, and it is a group’s policies that determine its recruiting, and ultimately its overall, success. (Location 259)
  • I show that after the initial decision to take up arms (which is based on individual grievances), fighters view armed groups (fighting for the goal they are interested in) as institutions and make the decision to join or switch groups by comparing their organizational capabilities. The groups that are the best organized internally, have less corruption, and provide more for their members become the most popular with fighters. (Location 264)
  • However, one side effect of using ideology as a screening mechanism is attracting people more interested in ideology than in the actual goal of the group: power. (Location 270)
  • Most previous evidence in insurgency violence literature is post hoc, relying on retrospective interviews of survivors or an individual fighter’s online footprint. My data, drawn from in-person surveys and interviews on the frontlines of the ongoing conflict, affords information gathered in near real-time, avoids survivorship bias, and also sheds light on the intentions of fighters in making particular decisions. (Location 278)
  • while a significant body of academic and policy research is looking at the “violence” part of the definition, trying to understand why and how groups engage in violence, the human, “group” part of it often receives less attention—even though without the humans, there is no group (and, as a result, no one to conduct those acts of violence). (Location 350)
  • Recent research, however, has started paying more attention to the internal structure of rebel movements through comparative analyses, a very important step toward understanding violent non-state actors’ internal organization and human resources. In his book, Jacob Shapiro shows that one of the main difficulties armed groups struggle with is their human resources. (Location 395)
  • Jeremy Weinstein, in comparing leading insurgency groups in different countries, looks at why some rebellions are ideologically motivated, while others are more oriented toward immediate profit, and how it affects recruitment.10 According to his argument, a group either enjoys resources and is consumption-oriented or is ideologically motivated with limited resources, and a group’s recruitment strategy depends on this classification. (Location 398)
  • On one hand, research looks at the first step prospective fighters take, answering the question, “What makes individuals take up weapons?” For example, organizers of rebellions use three principal ways to recruit soldiers: forced recruitment,12 offering immediate material incentives or promising such benefits in the future,13 or appealing to the fighters’ sense of grievance.14 It has also been shown that relative deprivation,15 in-group ties and bonds,16 out-group aversions,17 the desire to improve one’s social status,18 the relative danger of remaining a civilian,19 social networks,20 and even simple boredom21 drive people to mobilize for violence. (Location 410)
    • Note: Citations
  • As previously shown by the works of Iannaccone and Berman, radical ideology and a strict set of concordant internal rules allow a group not only to screen prospective members, but also to ensure that only the most dedicated fighters remain in the group.29 (Location 458)
  • While being effectively organized allows groups to win the competition for human resources—their most important resource—the right use of ideology ensures the quality of those human resources. As a result, well-organized groups are more likely to look like the most ideological. (Location 482)
  • As part of the broader “Voices of Syria” project (with Sam Whitt and Loubna Mrie), more than six hundred refugees, civilians, and fighters were surveyed on how they self-selected into those roles. (Location 513)
  • In addition, retrospective studies also negatively impact individual-level research. When these studies are conducted in the aftermath of an especially protracted, brutal civil war, there is an obvious selection bias for survivors, and it is not clear how people who survived differ from those who did not. For example, fighters who chose to fight in the most active combat zones are killed in disproportionate numbers and are therefore minimally present in such studies. Conducting surveys for four years of conflict on frontlines of varying intensity allowed me to reach as many respondents as possible, people who would no longer be alive after the conflict was over. It is very likely that many, if not most, of the fighters and civilians surveyed and interviewed for the study are no longer alive. (Location 516)
  • 10 Jeremy M. Weinstein, Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 11 Eli Berman, Radical, Religious, and Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011). (Location 641)
  • 21 Enzo Nussio and Juan E. Ugarriza, “Are Insurgents Any Different from Counterinsurgents? A Systematic Integration and Validation of Motivational Studies from Colombia.” A Systematic Integration and Validation of Motivational Studies from Colombia (August 16, 2013). Forthcoming in Análisis Político (2013). (Location 661)
  • Therefore, a group would win this market competition by making itself the most appealing to potential new adherents and those who would switch from other rebel groups. This would both increase the one group’s resources and decrease that of competitors in this zero–sum game. (Location 729)
  • In low-technology civil wars, where all groups only have access to older weapons, power is a function of human resources, and the group that wins the internal competition for manpower will have a significant advantage. (Location 735)
    • Note: This is key
  • Those people who prefer to stay do not perform a cost–benefit calculation in quite the same way. Although they understand the risks involved, some do not leave only because they want to protect their family and property. Others are interested in the goals of the rebellion and want to support it. Consequently, those who stay to support the goal of the war enter the pool of potential members rebel groups are competing for. (Location 760)
  • It is telling if a person was active in the civil war before any material resources became available, and when it was particularly dangerous to participate in the rebellion. Another way armed groups can see if a fighter is devoted to the goal is to send him, from time to time, to the most active frontline to fight. Here the group can monitor his behavior. (Location 848)
  • economic club model theory of religious groups and sects developed by Iannaccone (1994), (Location 859)
  • To ensure they get only the most trustworthy and loyal prospective fighters, the most organized, successful, and well-funded groups not only screen prospective fighters, but also add a cost to membership. They do so by presenting prospective fighters with a condition: adherence to a strict set of requirements that have no direct relevance to their fighting ability. (Location 861)
  • First, they should be costly for the individual, which means he must make significant effort to follow them. If those costs are not high enough, they are not a good screening mechanism because they would be too easy for someone to fake. Also, the requirements should not be enjoyable. People who enjoy the requirements cannot be separated from fighters who behave strategically, and as a result, the group’s ability to screen decreases. (Location 865)
  • such costs should also be very visible because their main purpose is to indicate when someone is slacking. (Location 871)
  • While organizational culture in the civilian world might sometimes seem a little strange, the unproductive costs and strict requirements employed by armed groups look irrational and bizarre at best. Consequently, groups need to at least try to explain the rationale behind them to their members. Ideology—which by definition is a group-specified set of ideals, principles, beliefs, doctrines, myths, or symbols of a social movement, institution, class, or large group that explains how society should work—often comes in handy for that purpose. To be able to serve as a rationale for assuming unproductive costs of membership in a group, an ideology should satisfy several conditions. (Location 876)
  • Ideology as a screening mechanism has proven to be reliable, but it is not without problems, some of which are quite unexpected. (Location 892)
  • Adopting strict rules grounded in ideology can screen out people with low dedication levels from a group, but it cannot control the upper bar of dedication. (Location 937)
  • Therefore, a group that portrays itself as ideological may be attractive to recruits more interested in the ideology than in the actual goal of the group. In other words, these recruits may be more radical than the group wants its fighters to be. (Location 938)
  • Because those group members are more interested in the ideology than in the group’s military and political objections, they put ideological objectives in front of military necessity and, as a result, make the group less effective on the battlefield and in the political arena. 2.Once in the group, they soon realize it was not what they expected and become disappointed. From there, it is only a matter of time until they act on that disappointment. They might stay in the group and sabotage it from the inside, or leave and harm its reputation from the outside. 3.More radical group members will not be satisfied with the average level of the group’s ideology and will try to increase it to their desirable level, challenging the leadership. And because by definition they are extremely dedicated to their goal, little would stop them in pursuing those changes. (Location 947)
  • Many group characteristics that are attractive to prospective members, such as salaries and medical care, are not only expensive but are also long-lasting in nature, requiring long-term investments. In effect, one of the main jobs of leaders is to balance the budget, maximize income, and optimize spending. In contrast to regular state armies, rebel armed groups do not have a budget assigned to them every year. (Location 973)
  • This shows that no organization can have a successful long-term strategy if it does not have leaders with the right qualifications to plan it; and no good plan will work if there is no one capable of executing it. (Location 989)
  • Successful groups are able to find or internally promote the most qualified people, learn from their own mistakes and the mistakes of others, and build a functioning organization, while unsuccessful ones fail to do so. Unsuccessful groups think meritocracy is not the most effective system for choosing leadership. Other unsuccessful groups, while realizing the importance of choosing the most qualified candidates, cannot always find or recognize people with the right qualifications. (Location 993)
  • An additional problem faced by rebel groups is the high likelihood of leaders—in top and middle levels—being killed in combat. In an ordinary organization, a director’s tenure is already established, and even if he becomes sick or wants to retire, he will usually have time to choose and train a successor. This is not the case in a combat zone. Here, a group leader could be killed in a matter of seconds without having chosen a substitute or passed on any knowledge. Even more devastating to a group is the death of several leaders at the same time. (Location 1026)
  • A fighter who wants to get promoted will try to show his loyalty by exceeding minimal behavioral requirements imposed by the group’s Islamist ideology. (Location 1046)
  • 8 I. S. Fulmer, B. Gerhart, and K. S. Scott, “Are the 100 Best Better? An Empirical Investigation of the Relationship Between Being a ‘Great Place to Work’ and Firm Performance,” Personnel Psychology 56 (2003): 965–993. (Location 1104)
  • 26 Larry E. Greiner, “Evolution and Revolution as Organizations Grow,” Harvard Business Review 54, no. 4 (July/August 1972): 37–46. (Location 1140)
  • When the revolution turned into a civil war, everything changed. There were no more playing children, open shops, or cars on the street. Instead, people with weapons (fighters) were sitting at checkpoints drinking tea brought to them by people without weapons (civilians), and watching others flee their homes (refugees). (Location 1148)
  • A sample of fighters and civilians was chosen from two areas: in and around Aleppo, Syria’s second largest city and the place of the major battles at the time of research, and in and around the city of Idlib, which was also experiencing violence but generally was considered a safer area for rebel forces and civilians. Because I am interested in difficult-to-reach subpopulations in dangerous environments with unknown population parameters, I use cluster-sampling methods. (Location 1159)
  • Another, deeper cause surfaced and rose far above the others: the desire for revenge. (Location 1313)
  • In racking up only a few votes, civilians strongly disagreed that fighters joined for money (2 percent) or respect (4 percent), or were forced to join (0 percent). (Location 1351)
  • Among Assad’s perceived crimes against the Syrian people were attacking peaceful demonstrators, arresting children in Daraa for writing anti-Assad graffiti,10 massacring hundreds in Homs in 2012, and even spending the majority of Syrian oil revenue on the regime army. Most of the time, not even regime troops were considered the object of revenge. Even concerning the chemical attacks, surveyed fighters put blame solely on Assad, while only slightly more than half of respondents blamed his forces. In addition, 15 percent of surveyed fighters believed Assad’s troops were not guilty at all in this incident. (Location 1357)
  • Overall, when compared to civilians, fighters were happier, most likely because they were acting on their grievances in a way in which they could see results. (Location 1363)
  • Revenge may have its emotional perks, but there is also an emotional downside. Fighters were extremely angry and extremely sad twice as often as civilians, and felt more exhausted (Graph 2.5). They were also twice as likely as their civilian counterparts to experience extreme fear. (Location 1369)
  • Another fighter, formerly with the Islamist group Fajr al Islam (now part of al-Nusra) before leaving in 2014, recalls, After the end of Alsehel battle with Shia militias, and the regime took control of the villages around our positions, I thought, “Why am I still fighting?” I had lost my right hand to a sniper shot, and when I was bleeding, no one could help because we simply did not have enough people. . . . we only had Kalashnikovs [AK47s], while the enemy had tanks and planes. I felt that God’s angels were helping us, but rationally I thought, “What can a left-handed man do in front of those tanks? Nothing”. . . so I found a way to get out of the city and ended up opening a small restaurant to sell falafel. Now the only thing I am fighting for is food for my kids. (Location 1413)
  • Many former fighters had also become frustrated with the lack of organization in their groups. Bad leadership was an important factor for 65 percent of respondents while 59 percent pointed to the lack of discipline. More than 52 percent said their group was not working as a team anymore. Generally, if fighters were dissatisfied with the organization of their group, they simply switched groups, (Location 1420)
  • A strong majority (76 percent) claimed that they would fight again if the West were to intervene militarily. (Location 1435)